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Article
The Right to Arms and Standards of Review:
A Tale of Three Circuits
DAVID T. HARDY
In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized an individual right to arms. The Court offered
limited guidance as to standard of review, only ruling out rational basis.
This Article takes a pragmatic approach to the standard of review
issue. First, it explores the practical basis for heightened scrutiny.
Judicial review is, at its base, anti-majoritarian. It is therefore often
appropriate to employ the loose standard of rational basis. In some
contexts, however, majoritarianism is less dependable: the majority may
be tempted to unfairly burden the interests of the minority. Here, courts
properly employ heightened standards of review.
I suggest that this rationale is applicable in the context of firearms
control. While, on a national basis, firearms owners are a sufficiently
large group to legislatively defend their legitimate interests, the story is
different at the state level. The strictest forms of gun control originate in
states where gun owners comprise only one-eighth to one-fifth of the
population, and have little legislative influence. The result is legislation
that is unsupported by existing criminological data, and sometimes serves
no demonstrable purpose other than burdening or annoying gun owners.
This Article closes by suggesting that varying levels of scrutiny, drawn
from election-law cases, are appropriate.
The least burdensome
legislation is weighed under a near-rational basis standard. Other
measures are properly weighed under intermediate review—genuine
intermediate review, where the legislation must be supported by hard data,
or under stricter exacting scrutiny. Finally, measures regulating what the
Court has termed the “core right” to arms—possession by law-abiding
citizens in the home—should be evaluated under strict scrutiny.
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The Right to Arms and Standards of Review:
A Tale of Three Circuits
DAVID T. HARDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual right to arms in
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 and its incorporation of the right in
McDonald v. Chicago,2 have been followed by a considerable number of
challenges to federal and state firearm laws. Since the Court declined to
identify any applicable standard of review in Heller,3 and the standard
employed determines who bears the burden of proof as well as how great
that burden is, a threshold issue in those challenges has become the
determination of the standard.
This Article examines the origins of standards of review to seek a
theory that explains their bases, and applies that theory to the legal issues
now pending. It will then outline how three chosen circuit courts of
appeals have applied standards of review to challenges against firearm
regulations. Finally, it will chart a possible course for the future while
avoiding foreseeable pitfalls.
II. BACKGROUND TO STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Standards of review are traditionally divided into three, perhaps four,
levels:
(1) Strict Scrutiny, which requires the government to prove
that a law serves a “compelling” government interest and is
“narrowly tailored,” such that it does not unnecessarily
burden exercises of the underlying right.4 Strict scrutiny
has been called “strict in theory and fatal in fact,” although
*

David T. Hardy, PC, Tucson, Arizona. Mr. Hardy’s articles on firearms laws and the right to
arms have been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3033 n.10 (2010) (plurality), 130 S. Ct. at 3079 (Thomas, J., concurring), and in Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 610, 626 n.4 (1974) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1
554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
2
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036, 3042 (2010).
3
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to
keep and use for the protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.” (quoting
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007))).
4
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2007).

1438

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1435

this is actually not quite the case; when it is applied,
challenged restrictions have about a thirty percent survival
rate.5
(2) Intermediate Review requires a showing that a challenged
law is “substantially related to an important governmental
objective.”6 As with strict scrutiny, the government bears
the burden of proof, and its “justification must be genuine,
not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation.”7
(3) Exacting Scrutiny can be seen as a subset of intermediate
review, although it comes closer to strict scrutiny. This test
requires the challenged law to have “a substantial relation”
to “a sufficiently important governmental interest,” which
“must reflect the seriousness of the . . . burden” on the
exercise of a constitutional right.8
(4) Rational Basis Review presumes the constitutionality of
the law,9 and only requires the court to find that the
legislature could have had a rational basis for enacting the
statute.10 Under this standard, a challenged regulation will
usually survive, unless the government interest asserted is
not legitimate.11
Standards of review are judicial creations, and some Justices have
rejected them entirely.12 Justice Scalia has wittily suggested that “[t]hese
5
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Court, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794, 814–15 (2006).
6
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1998).
7
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
8
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S.
724, 744 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9
See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (employing the presumption of
constitutionality).
10
Id.
11
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 437, 442 (1985) (holding that
accommodating residents’ irrational fears of the mentally retarded is not a legitimate government
interest).
12
See id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I have never been persuaded that these so-called
‘standards’ adequately explain the decisional process.”); see also Memorandum from Potter Stewart to
Harry Blackmun (Feb. 6, 1980) (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of
Harry A. Blackmun, Box 1409) (“Since I think a ‘rational basis’ test is a fallacious and artificial
construct, and since I do not understand what ‘fundamental interest’ means, I could not join the first
sentence of that footnote.”) While Justice Kennedy expressly applied standards of review in certain
opinions, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (using strict scrutiny); Turner Broad.
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (using intermediate scrutiny), in others he did not employ
them where such use might have been expected, see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682,
2693 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act violates the Equal Protection Clause, without
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tests are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element
of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will
be applied in each case.”13
An examination of the rationale underlying the levels of review may,
however, demonstrate some recurring themes that at least shed light upon
which standard should be applied in a given case.
III. SEEKING THE PRAGMATIC BASIS OF HEIGHTENED REVIEW
The concept of heightened review originated in the most famous
footnote in constitutional law, footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.14 There the Court applied rational basis to a commercial
restriction, but noted:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation. . . .
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or
national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
identifying a standard of review). In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Kennedy
observed, “I adhere to my view, however, that content-based speech restrictions that do not fall within
any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling
government interests.” 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991)
(Kennedy, J. concurring) (“Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis is ill
advised when all that is at issue is a content-based restriction, for resorting to the test might be read as a
concession that States may censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for
doing so.”).
13
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 516, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982) (calling footnote four “the most celebrated footnote in
constitutional law”).
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minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.15
It was a modest beginning, with the Court reserving, rather than
exercising, judgment. The footnote can, however, be distilled into a simple
principle: judicial review is fundamentally anti-majoritarian. As a general
rule, the Court should not interfere with decisions reached by a majority
unless they are completely unjustifiable. But the Court also has an
expanded constitutional role where majoritarian institutions fail to observe
the rights of a minority, specifically when a majority might subvert the
political process to ensure its continuation in power or focus upon and seek
to disadvantage a minority as such.16 In these settings, majoritarian
institutions are apt to reach unjust results, and it is appropriate for the one
branch of the government that does not answer to the majority to play an
expanded role.
The Court has sometimes adverted to this underlying principle. In
Anderson v. Celebrezze,17 it struck down an electoral restriction whose
burden fell most heavily on small political parties, writing that “because
the interests of minor parties and independent candidates are not well
represented in state legislatures, the risk that the First Amendment rights of
those groups will be ignored in legislative decisionmaking may warrant
more careful judicial scrutiny.”18 Along the same lines, Justice O’Connor
noted in a different case that “heightened scrutiny helps to ensure
that . . . the State’s asserted interests are not merely a pretext for
exclusionary or anti-competitive restrictions.”19
Heightened scrutiny applies when majoritarianism is an especially
weak protection for minority interests.20 This understanding also informs
the choice between degrees of heightened scrutiny.
Racially
discriminatory measures receive strict scrutiny, while gender
discrimination is subject to intermediate review21—perhaps because
African-Americans comprise only twelve percent of the American

15

Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
See id. (addressing the “narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality” in
the context of treatment by the majority of religious, racial, and national minorities).
17
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
18
Id. at 793 n.16.
19
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
20
See id. (describing how a majority might fail to protect a minority).
21
Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’” (quoting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996)
(describing the “heightened review standard” under which the Court has, “[w]ithout equating gender
classifications . . . to classifications based on race or national origin, . . . carefully inspected official
action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men)”).
16
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population, whereas women comprise a slight majority.
Thus, state
discrimination against legal aliens, who cannot vote, is also subject to strict
scrutiny,23 while discrimination against the mentally disabled, whose
supporters have secured enactment of protective legislation for them, is
not.24
In sum, the Court’s standards of review reflect a pragmatic basis.
When a segment of the American population can use the democratic
process to defend its interests and avoid injustice, courts should not
second-guess the result; a rational relationship to a legitimate interest
suffices. Where that process cannot be relied upon to prevent inequities,
the judiciary must play a greater role through heightened review.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PRAGMATIC STANDARD
IN SECOND AMENDMENT CASES
The Heller Court quite properly ruled out rational basis review25
because, as the Carolene Products footnote suggested, restrictions of Bill
of Rights guarantees are subject to heightened review.26 After all, those
guarantees reflect areas of liberty that the Framers specifically meant to
protect against majoritarian processes. But questions remain regarding
which of the heightened standards of review should be employed and, if
intermediate review is chosen, how strictly it should be applied. To answer
these questions, we must depart from law and turn to politics.
On a national basis, gun owners are hardly a minority against whom
unjust laws can be passed with impunity. Last year, Congress voted
against some very modest gun control measures.27 As this Article was
being written, Colorado voters recalled their senate president and another
state senator due to their support for gun legislation.28 Recent polls
indicate that around thirty-nine percent of American households have a

22
LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MAYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION:
2010, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf; SONYA
RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.
23
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
24
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444–46 (1985).
25
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
26
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”).
27
See Roll Call Votes 113th Cong.—1st Session, on S. Amdt. 715 to S. 649, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1
&vote=00097 (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (rejecting an amendment on April 17, 2013, that would
require background checks for private gun sales at gun shows and over the Internet).
28
T.M. Fasano, Gun Control Laws Still Hot Topic in Colorado, GREELEY TRIB., Jan. 19, 2014, at
State & Regional News.
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firearm, which may be a low estimate since respondents might have been
wary about disclosing gun ownership to a stranger. Accordingly, it
appears that the political process can protect against enactment of
unwarranted laws and secure the repeal of existing ones.
The picture is different, however, in certain portions of the nation. In
2001, a nationwide survey found that 8.7% of Hawai‘i households, 12% of
Massachusetts households, and 21.3% of California households contained
a firearm.30 Whether these lower rates of household firearm ownership are
a cause or effect of regulation—or perhaps both—most would agree that
these states have the most extensive firearm controls.31
The association of “small minority” status with stricter gun control
does not, of course, prove that the result is discriminatory or unjust. There
are, however, three indications that the majority is misusing its powers: (1)
the tendency of these state laws to exempt the politically and economically
powerful from their restrictions; (2) indications of animus toward the class
of persons being restricted; and (3) the willingness of legislatures to enact
laws which serve no apparent purpose except to burden or annoy the
affected class.32
A. The Exemption of the Politically or Economically Powerful from Gun
Control Regulations
Like the First Amendment’s neutral time, manner, and place
restrictions,33 if firearm regulations apply equally to the powerful and their
allies, they will tend to be reasonable; if the powerful and their allies can
exempt themselves, there is no such check. The Court has most clearly
recognized this principle in the electoral arena, where the two largest

29
The Economist/YouGov Poll, YOUGOV 15 (Jan. 5, 2014), http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/
cumulus_uploads/document/tkzv4c1e8v/econTabReport.pdf.
30
BRFSS Survey Results 2001 for Nationwide Firearms, N.C. ST. CENTER FOR HEALTH
STAT., http://www.schs.state.nc.us/schs/brfss/2001/us/firearm3.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). At the
other end of the scale, guns are found in 50.7% of North Dakota households and in 57.8% of Alaska
households. Id. Nearly identical results were reported in a 2007 survey, which found household gun
ownership at 6.7% in Hawai‘i, 12.6% in Massachusetts, and 21.3% in California. Deborah White, Gun
Owners
as
a
Percentage
of
Each
State’s
Population,
ABOUT.COM,
http://usliberals.about.com/od/Election2012Factors/a/Gun-Owners-As-Percentage-Of-Each-StatesPopulation.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
31
The Brady Campaign Against Gun Violence counts California as having the strictest controls in
the nation, followed by New Jersey, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and Hawai‘i. Brady
Issues 2011 Scorecards, WCTV, http://www.wctv.tv/news/headlines/Brady_Campaign_Issues_2011_S
tate_Scorecards__139446468.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
32
See infra Parts IV.A–C (explaining indication of a misuse of powers in depth).
33
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (“[A] regulation of the time,
place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate,
content-neutral interests . . . .”).
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parties are apt to collude against smaller parties.
Firearms laws commonly exempt police officers, security guards, and
other governmental employees.35 These laws often can be understood, but
less explicable are exemptions for retired officials,36 who have no duties.37
Sometimes, private bodyguards are likewise exempted,38 enabling the
powerful to employ armed escorts. Paradoxically, some of these
bodyguards are forbidden to possess arms off-duty—they can protect their
patrons but not themselves.39
Where firearm permits are required and issued at the discretion of
34
See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186 (1979) (holding
that a law requiring 25,000 signatures to start a new political party was unconstitutional because it was
not the least restrictive way to eliminate frivolous parties); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)
(recognizing that Ohio laws “give the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new
parties struggling for existence and thus place substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote
and the right to associate”); Patriot Party v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 261 (3d
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that minor parties are constitutionally protected); Socialist Workers Party v.
Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 400 U.S. 806 (1970) (recognizing the effect
of New York election provisions as the denial of independent or minority parties and equal opportunity
to win).
35
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25450, 26300 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(b)(1)
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-6(1) (West 2005). At the national level, the Gun Control
Act exempts law enforcement from most of its provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012). The one
exception is possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3)(B) (requiring evidence that transferees have not been convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence). Conversely, federal law allows the armament of employees
of some rather unexpected organizations. The EPA has 202 armed employees; the FDA has 183; the
Federal Reserve Board has 141; and the various Offices of Inspectors General, charged with preventing
fraud, waste, and abuse, have over 3500. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 5–6.
36
D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a)(2); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 25450 (exempting honorably
retired officers from restrictions on concealed carrying); id. § 26015 (exempting them from the ban on
open carrying); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20.e (McKinney 2008) (exempting retired peace officers from
the ban on large-capacity magazines). The Federal Assault Weapon ban, now expired, also exempted
retired police. 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(4)(C) (2000).
37
It is worth noting that if a law enforcement official becomes too emotionally unstable for duty,
he or she often qualifies for a disability retirement. See, e.g., State Police Disability (Section 363-b),
OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER, N.Y. ST. & LOCAL RETIREMENT SYS., http://www.osc.state.ny.us/RETIRE/p
ublications/vo1518/disability_ret_benefits/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014) (noting that a state police officer
is entitled to disability benefit if he or she is, among other requirements, “[p]hysically or mentally
unable to perform [his or her] duties as the natural and proximate result of a disability sustained in
service”); Retirement Estimate Calculator: For Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS)
Members, ST. N.J., DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/pfrstimate.shtml (last
updated Apr. 18, 2013) (explaining that an individual can qualify for “Accidental Disability” if he or
she is “physically or mentally incapacitated from performing [his or her] normal or assigned job
duties”).
38
See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a)(1)(A) (permitting organizations to register guns if it requires
employees to be armed on duty); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26015 (exempting armored vehicle guards from
the ban on the carrying of loaded firearms).
39
This was the situation in which Dick Heller, respondent in District of Columbia v. Heller, found
himself. He could possess a handgun in Washington, D.C., while protecting others, but not while
protecting himself. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575–76 (2008).
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licensing authorities, similar disparities often emerge. For example, in
New York City, as recently as the 1970s, it was common to pay police
precinct officials a $100 bribe to obtain a permit.40 The City responded by
centralizing the pistol permit process.41 But with bribery removed as an
incentive, licensing authorities had no reason at all to grant permits. In
December 1978, the NYPD administrators decided to slow down
processing by requiring applicants to make an appointment to present their
applications.42 By March 1979, the pistol licensing office was setting
appointments for a year down the road.43
Filing an application, however, would not do the average citizen much
good. When forty black and Puerto Rican women sought permits to
protect their families against an outbreak of muggings they were informed
that it was “the policy of this department not to give out permits for people
who want to protect themselves.”44 But a different policy seemingly
applies to the rich and famous: New York City pistol permits have been
issued to Donald Trump, Don Imus, Sean Hannity, Howard Stern, Robert
De Niro, and others with clout.45
The same experience has been noted in California. For nineteen years,
Los Angeles had a simple policy: no permits to carry a concealed weapon
shall be issued to anyone, no matter how sterling the applicant or
demonstrable the need.46 Between 1974 and 1993, exactly one concealed
carry permit was issued—to the City’s new police chief, to tide him over
until he was certified as a California law enforcement official.47
Los Angeles County did issue some permits during the same
timeframe, but in utterly arbitrary fashion. “For many years, campaign
contributors to Sheriff Brad Gates enjoyed an almost 100% chance of
obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon if they applied.”48 Persons
whom his office had rejected for permits ultimately sued and won under
the Equal Protection Clause.49 Sheriff Gates’s successor has continued to
40

GEORGE BRAZILLER, THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 188–89

(1972).
41

Id.
Fed’n of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. McGuire, 420 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979).
43
Id.
44
40 in Bronx Seek Gun Permits for Protection Against Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1969, at
31.
45
Reuven Blau, Madoff Son of a Gun, N.Y. POST, Dec. 27, 2009, at 9; Rocco Parascandola &
Alison Gendar, Lifestyles of the Rich and Packin’: High-Profile Celebrities Seeking Gun Permits on the
Rise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/09/27/2010-0927_celebrities_seeking_pistol_permits_on_the_rise_in_the_city_lifestyles_of_rich_n_.html.
46
J. NEIL SCHULMAN, STOPPING POWER: WHY 70 MILLION AMERICANS OWN GUNS 111 (1999).
47
Id.
48
Dan Weikel, 12 Year Gun Permit Cases Nearing Trial, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1990, at B4.
49
Dan Weikel, Gates Off Hook in Suit: County to Pay $616,000, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-11-17/news/mn-4314_1_gun-permits; Dan Weikel, Lawyers Take
42
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50

reward campaign donors with permits.
In short, the wealthy, the politically powerful, and their allies tend to
exempt themselves from the restrictions considered necessary for the rest
of the citizenry.
B. Indications of Animus Toward the Class or Some of Its Members
Firearm restrictions sometimes appear to be based on little more than a
desire to burden or annoy firearm owners. When Chicago’s handgun ban
was struck down in McDonald v. Chicago,51 city officials responded by
creating a restrictive permit system requiring that the applicant prove a
certain amount of training at a firing range—while at the same time
retaining its ban on firing ranges.52 In a sharply worded opinion, the
Seventh Circuit struck down the City’s firing range ban.53 In a similar
vein, after the Supreme Court voided the District of Columbia’s handgun
ban, the District required a permit to possess a handgun.54 A reporter
found that the process to obtain a permit took months and required her “to
take a five-hour class that is only taught outside of the District, pay $465 in
fees, sign six forms, pass a written test on gun laws, get fingerprinted, be
subject to a police ballistics test and take days off work.”55
The categories of persons forbidden to possess firearms often reflect
prejudice toward certain groups. For example, New York’s Sullivan Act
forbade carrying of weapons by unnaturalized aliens, no matter how lawabiding.56 Massachusetts likewise banned legal aliens from securing
permits to possess handguns, until the law was stricken in 2012.57 The
sponsor of a similar law in California from 1924 explained that it would
have a “salutary effect in checking tong wars among the Chinese and

Final Shots in Gates Gun Permit Case, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/199009-28/local/me-1390_1_gun-permits.
50
See Gene Maddaus, Sheriff Lee Baca and the Gun-Gift Connection, L.A. WKLY.
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.laweekly.com/2013-02-14/news/sheriff-lee-baca-concealed-weaponspermit/ (drawing connections between those who donated to Sheriff Lee Baca’s campaign and those
who received gun permits).
51
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 3050 (2010).
52
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011).
53
Id. at 711.
54
D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2012).
55
Emily Miller, Emily Got Her Gun, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 3:23 PM),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/guns/2012/feb/8/miller-emily-got-her-gun/.
56
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1897 (Consol. 1909) (making it a felony for any “person not a citizen of
the United States” to carry a weapon); REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON A UNIFORM ACT TO REGULATE THE
SALE AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 711, 728–
29 (1924) (stating that “[n]o unnaturalized foreign-born person and no person who has been convicted
of a felony” may possess a handgun).
57
Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 303 (D. Mass. 2012).
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vendettas among our people who are of Latin descent.” At the federal
level, the Gun Control Act of 196859 forbids firearm possession by those
who have renounced U.S. citizenship, been dishonorably discharged from
the military, or are aliens visiting the U.S. on a “nonimmigrant visa,”60
none of which seems to have correlation with violent tendencies.61
C. Arbitrary Enactment or Retention of Restrictions
California illustrates the difficulties of dealing with unjustified
restrictions via majoritarian processes. In 1923, when there were no
federal firearm laws worth mentioning, the state required handgun dealers
to be licensed.62 The California requirement remains on the books today,63
and, in 2002, the state forbade California dealers from selling handguns
that had not been approved for safety by the state, necessitating extensive
laboratory testing paid for by the manufacturer.64 An exemption for law
enforcement officers and prosecutors65 indicates that safety was not
actually the primary objective.
That the gun-owning minority (and, as noted above, it is indeed a small
minority in the states under discussion) cannot count upon majority
protection against arbitrary laws is demonstrated by “one-gun-a-month”
laws, which forbid a person from purchasing more than one firearm, or one
handgun, in a given thirty-day period.66 The rationale is to prevent gun
traffickers from purchasing large numbers of guns where firearm laws are
less restrictive, and then illegally selling the firearms in states where
firearm laws are strict.67 Yet such laws have been enacted in California,

58

New Firearms Law Effective on August 7, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1923, available at
http://www.claytoncramer.com/primary/other/SFChronicle1923.PDF (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59
Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–928 (2012)).
60
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)–(7).
61
See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the “Wrong” Hands: The
Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 95, 98 n.42, 120 (1995)
(arguing that the Brady Law’s efforts to keep guns out of the “wrong” hands, such as aliens or those
dishonorably discharged, has little effect on disarming violent offenders). The author has a friend, an
enlistee who became a conscientious objector and who refused to serve in Vietnam. He received a lessthan-honorable discharge, but fortunately not a dishonorable one. Otherwise, he would be barred from
gun possession—precisely because he refused to shoot at people.
62
1923 CAL. STAT. 701-02 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 26500 (West 2012)).
63
Id. §§ 26500, 26520, & 26700.
64
2002 CAL. STAT. 5787 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 32010(c)).
65
Id. § 32000(b)(4).
66
See infra note 68 (citing examples of states that currently have one-gun-per-month legislation).
67
See Michael J. Habib, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald and Heller and the
Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1379 (2012) (arguing that “the very
purpose of one-gun-per-month laws is to prevent the flow of firearms into the hands of unlicensed
citizens”).
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Maryland, and New Jersey, three of the strictest states in the nation when
it comes to gun laws. It is hard to understand why a gun-runner would
choose to buy in New Jersey, where he must obtain a Firearm ID card plus
a police permit for each handgun and wait thirty days for that to be
granted,69 so that he can sell the firearm in a state where he could have
purchased one without any of these procedures. It is hard to explain these
states’ imposition of a “one-gun-a-month” rule except in terms of the
majority’s desire to impose one more restriction upon the minority.
In sum, there appear to be three factors that counsel heightened levels
of review: (1) exemption of the rich and politically powerful from the
restrictions imposed upon all others; (2) indications of animus toward the
gun-owning minority; and (3) the seemingly irrational enactment or
retention of laws affecting it. The majoritarian process is an ineffective
protection for minority rights in these areas.
This understanding also serves as a limiting principle. There are other
minorities that have been singled out for exceptional regulatory attention.
Those who smoke tobacco come immediately to mind, but laws burdening
smokers that do not exempt the powerful and well-connected (even the
President of the United States has to step outside the White House to light
up70), appear far less motivated by animus and (despite tobacco’s death toll
being forty times that of firearms71) rarely take irrational forms. Anyone of
legal age may smoke, just not inside (or sometimes near an entrance).
We turn now from theory to practice.
V. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO STANDARD OF REVIEW IN RIGHT
TO ARMS CASES: A TALE OF THREE CIRCUITS
All circuit court decisions post-Heller72 have opted to apply an
intermediate standard of review, rather than strict scrutiny, albeit with
occasional dicta invoking either rational basis or strict scrutiny.73 It should
68
CAL. PENAL CODE § 27535(a); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(i) (West 2005).
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(a), (b), (i).
70
Why Is Obama Still Smoking?, THE WEEK (Mar. 3, 2010), http://theweek.com/article/index/200
270/why-is-obama-still-smoking.
71
The CDC estimates that smoking causes 440,000 deaths annually. Tobacco-Related
Mortality, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statisti
cs/fact_sheets/health_effects/tobacco_related_mortality/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). It calculates the
same figure for firearms homicides as 11,078. Assault or Homicide, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
72
A pre-Heller Fifth Circuit ruling, United States v. Emerson, applied strict scrutiny. 270 F.3d
203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001). Emerson was the first circuit court ruling that the Second Amendment
protected an individual right unrelated to militia duties. Id. at 264.
73
See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2012) (drawing a
comparison to First Amendment cases that apply differing levels of scrutiny); United States v. Carter,
669 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing the government’s interest in protecting people from
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be recognized that, when firearms laws are at issue, the first element of
intermediate review becomes of little importance. None would dispute that
minimizing homicide and violent crime is a valid and substantial
governmental interest. The remaining issues are those of “fit”; how well
does the regulation serve that interest, and how much does it burden
activities whose restriction would not impair that interest. Here, we may
examine the treatment of the right to arms in three circuits that have to date
produced the more interesting results: the Second, Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits.
A. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit applies the right to arms in a narrow fashion:
“[H]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like the
complete prohibition of handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a
substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use
a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).”74 Under the
Second Circuit approach, burdens that are less than substantial are subject
only to rational basis review.75 This is difficult to reconcile with Heller,
which expressly ruled out rational basis review,76 and with the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment precedent. In the area of election-related
regulations for instance, the Court applies different tests to substantial and
insubstantial burdens on the affected right—but the tests employed are
strict scrutiny and intermediate review,77 rather than intermediate review
and rational basis. In the case of commercial speech, the Court has held
that deceptive or crime-inducing advertisements are entirely outside First
Amendment protections78 (just as Heller ruled that “dangerous and
unusual” arms were outside those of the Second Amendment79), and that
all other expression was subject to a strict form of intermediate scrutiny.80
Even where the impairment is found to be substantial, the Second
Circuit applies a limited version of intermediate review. In Kachalsky v.
crime as an important governmental interest); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244,
1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the appropriateness and applicability of intermediate scrutiny in
the context of gun regulations); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011)
(noting that intermediate scrutiny does not require use of the least intrusive means); United States v.
Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (recognizing that opposing parties “champion competing” strict
and intermediate scrutiny standards).
74
United States v. DeCastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
75
Id.
76
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
77
See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (describing differing tests applied to differing
circumstances in the area of election law).
78
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
79
554 U.S. at 627.
80
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 564.
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County of Westchester, the court faced a New York statute that required a
permit to carry a firearm, with the permit issued in the sole discretion of a
licensing authority.82 The opinion suggested that the applicable test
depends on the nature of the restricted gun-ownership right, with strict
scrutiny used for regulations that significantly burden the “core” right of
self-defense in the home83 (a later ruling renders this questionable84);
intermediate scrutiny for other “substantial” burdens;85 and presumably
rational basis for insignificant encroachments.
Kachalsky found that the New York licensing statute substantially
burdened a non-core aspect86 of the right and nominally applied
intermediate scrutiny.87 But its reasoning gave only lip service to
intermediate scrutiny.
As noted previously, intermediate scrutiny
presumes that a challenged regulation is unconstitutional.88 The Kachalsky
opinion only devoted four sentences to the key issue of whether there was
a reasonable fit between the legislation and the governmental goal.89 The
court merely noted that both sides had submitted data indicating that
firearm ownership by lawful citizens was, or was not, related to levels of
crime. Under intermediate scrutiny, the court should then have weighed
the data, and declared a tie if the government had failed to meet its burden.
But the Kachalsky court simply deferred to the legislature: “It is the
legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy
judgments.”90 The possibility of less-arbitrary alternatives (e.g., a permit
system with specific criteria) was left unexplored.
B. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has taken a more stringent approach to intermediate
81

701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 85–86. The applicant must demonstrate “proper cause” to obtain a license to carry a
concealed firearm. Id. at 86.
83
Id. at 93.
84
See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 172 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate review to a
pistol permit requirement for possession in the home, and upholding a $340 permit fee).
85
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96–97.
86
That is, it regulated carrying a firearm outside of the home. Id. at 94.
87
Id. at 96–97.
88
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
89
See id. at 98–99 (“But, as explained above, New York’s law need only be substantially related
to the state’s important public safety interest. A perfect fit between the means and the governmental
objective is not required. Here, instead of forbidding anyone from carrying a handgun in public, New
York took a more moderate approach to fulfilling its important objective and reasonably concluded that
only individuals having a bona fide reason to possess handguns should be allowed to introduce them
into the public sphere. That New York has attempted to accommodate certain particularized interests
in self defense does not somehow render its concealed carry restrictions unrelated to the furtherance of
public safety.”).
90
Id. at 99.
82
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review, if not always with consistency. In United States v. Chester,91 it
reviewed a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which generally prohibits
firearm possession by persons convicted of a domestic violence
misdemeanor.92 The court declined to apply strict scrutiny because the
defendant’s acts were “not within the core right identified in Heller—the
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess and carry a weapon for
self-defense,” and the defendant was decidedly not “law-abiding.”93 Then
it applied intermediate review and concluded that a remand was necessary
in light of the government’s failure to develop its empirical record and
proffer “sufficient evidence to establish a substantial relationship between
§ 922(g)(9) and an important governmental goal.”94
The Fourth Circuit subsequently considered United States v.
Masciandaro,95 which involved a traveling salesman cited for possessing a
loaded firearm while sleeping in his car in a National Park. The court
noted that, unlike Chester, the defendant was a law-abiding citizen, but
also unlike Chester, he was in a public park rather than his home.96 The
divided court did not examine empirical evidence, but the impairment of
the right to arms was minimal: the National Park regulation allowed
possession of a firearm so long as it was unloaded.97
These promising beginnings were rendered doubtful by Woollard v.
Gallagher,98 which involved a challenge to Maryland’s permit system for
carrying handguns. The system forbade (with a number of exceptions)
carrying a handgun without a permit, and permits were restricted to those
who could prove “good and substantial reason” for carrying.99 The Fourth
Circuit wrote at some length regarding the state’s evidence in support of its
system, which argued (in seemingly general terms) that restricting the
carrying of firearms would reduce the chances of criminals stealing them,
lessen the chance of a confrontation becoming lethal, and reduce the need
to investigate reports of a person seen with a firearm.100 Reconciling these
91

628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).
93
Id. at 683.
94
Id. On remand, the District Court found that the government had met its burden, and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d. 902 (S.D. W.
Va. 2012), aff’d, No. 12-4146, 2013 WL 1189253 (4th Cir. 2013).
95
638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
96
Id. at 470.
97
Id. at 474. An automatic handgun can be loaded, and a round chambered, in two seconds or
less. See Brian Palmer, How Many Times Can You Shoot a Handgun in Seven Minutes?, SLATE (Nov.
9, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/11/how_many_times_can_y
ou_shoot_a_handgun_in_seven_minutes.html (“FBI studies have shown that a novice can fire three
shots in less than a second, and a trained shooter can double that.”).
98
712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
99
Id. at 868.
100
Id. at 879–80.
92
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arguments with Heller does seem problematic, especially because they
suggest that a law-abiding citizen poses an indirect risk.
The Woollard appellees, however, raised another “reasonable fit”
argument and suggested that a different permit system with clearer criteria
be implemented101—perhaps requiring applicants to have a criminal record,
other indicia of stability, a fixed amount of training, and a demonstrable
need for self-defense. At this point the Circuit simply deferred to the
legislature: “[W]e cannot substitute those views for the considered
judgment of the General Assembly that the good-and-substantial-reason
requirement strikes an appropriate balance between granting handgun
permits to those persons known to be in need of self-protection and
precluding a dangerous proliferation of handguns on the streets of
Maryland.”102 As the Second Circuit had done in Kachalsky, the Fourth
Circuit appears to have applied intermediate scrutiny in name only.
C. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has taken a considerably more vigorous approach
to intermediate review than the Second and Fourth Circuits, but it has more
reason to do so. After all, the court has jurisdiction over Chicago, which
was reacting to the McDonald holding that the City’s handgun possession
ban was unconstitutional.103
In Ezell v. City of Chicago,104 decided a year after McDonald, the
Seventh Circuit confronted a Chicago ordinance that permitted handgun
possession permits, but only under a restrictive system that required the
applicant to be trained on a shooting range.105 Meanwhile, the City
retained its ban on indoor shooting ranges.106 Chicago advanced a number
of reasons for its ban—danger of accidental discharges, risk of firearm
theft, and lead contamination of the range’s users.107 The Seventh Circuit
held that “exacting scrutiny” governed review, since Chicago banned
rather than regulated ranges:
This is a serious encroachment on the right to maintain
proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the
meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for
self-defense. That the City conditions gun possession on
range training is an additional reason to closely scrutinize the
range ban.
All this suggests that a . . . rigorous
101

See id. at 881 (arguing that a “shall issue” regime would better serve to protect public safety).
Id.
103
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 3050 (2010).
104
651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
105
Id. at 689.
106
Id. at 690.
107
Id. at 692.
102
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not

quite

“strict

Under this standard, the Seventh Circuit explained:
[T]he City bears the burden of establishing a strong publicinterest justification for its ban on range training: The City
must establish a close fit between the range ban and the
actual public interests it serves, and also that the public’s
interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an
encumbrance on individual Second Amendment rights.
Stated differently, the City must demonstrate that civilian
target practice at a firing range creates such genuine and
serious risks to public safety that prohibiting range training
throughout the city is justified.109
The Ezell court concluded that Chicago “ha[d] not come close” to
meeting its burden: it had presented speculation rather than hard data, and
had not shown that its concerns could not be addressed through zoning and
other regulatory measures.110
Ezell was no fluke, as demonstrated the following year by Moore v.
Madigan,111 which struck down Illinois’s ban on carrying handguns.112
Interestingly, the opinion was written by Judge Posner, who is one of the
strongest critics of the Heller ruling.113 After reviewing the inconclusive
empirical evidence on the relationship between carrying firearms and
crime, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that it “fails to establish a pragmatic
defense of the Illinois Law.” The court concluded that Illinois must
provide “more than merely a rational basis for believing that its uniquely
sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety. It . . . failed to
meet this burden.”114
***
Overall, these three circuits have taken different approaches to
evaluating the constitutionality of firearm regulations. The Second Circuit
has applied a weak form of intermediate scrutiny and even suggested that
some regulations might be evaluated under rational basis review. The
Fourth Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny, but inconsistently. The
108

Id. at 708.
Id. at 708–09.
110
Id. at 709.
111
702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
112
Id. at 942.
113
See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 (describing Heller as a “snow job[]”).
114
Moore, 702 F.3d at 939, 942.
109
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Seventh Circuit has vigorously applied intermediate, or even exacting
scrutiny, carefully examining the empirical arguments advanced by the
defenders of the laws and holding them to their burden of proof.
VI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Having examined the empirical basis for standards of review, and how
the courts have handled the issue in the past, we can turn to evaluating
possible future approaches.
A. The Law Does Not Concern Itself with Trifles
Certain regulations burden the right to arms so little that rational basis
review might be justified. Examples of such regulations could include the
requirement that firearms be stamped with their makers’ names and serial
numbers,115 be made of materials visible on x-rays,116 not be carried into
narrowly defined areas such as federal courthouses,117 and be carried
openly, absent a concealed carry permit.118 These restrictions are so
nominal that a court should not have to review empirical data proving that
these measures have an impact on crime.
B. The Possibility of Strict Scrutiny
As noted above, several rulings have, in dicta, suggested that the “core
right” to arms (generally seen as that of law-abiding persons to own arms
for defense in their own homes) should be protected by strict scrutiny.119
This approach has merit. Heller itself entirely rules out a prohibition of the
core right;120 restrictions on it should be required to meet the highest
standard of review.121
C. A Blind Alley: “Substantial Burden”
As noted above, the Second Circuit suggests in dicta that intermediate
scrutiny may be limited to restrictions which “substantially” burden the

115

E.g., 27 C.F.R. § 478.92(a)(1) (2013).
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1)(B) (2012).
117
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 930(e)(1).
118
Alabama is one example of a state that employs such a scheme. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-50
(2013) (prohibiting concealed carrying of firearms without a permit).
119
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
120
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
121
See United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (“The individual right to
bear arms might well be a fundamental right, the restriction of which requires strict scrutiny. This
conclusion is supported by the placement of [the] Second Amendment within the Bill of Rights
alongside this Country’s most precious freedoms.”)
116
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122

right to arms.
It is difficult to see any basis for this in Heller or in
McDonald. The Supreme Court has employed a standard resembling this
in election-law cases.123 First, the Court in the election law cases uses the
standard to differentiate between laws that merit strict scrutiny and those
requiring intermediate review, but not to differentiate between intermediate
review and rational basis.124 Second, election regulations pose a unique
problem. Voting is protected by the First Amendment, but it is impossible
to meaningfully vote without governmental restrictions. The government
must establish the time and place where ballots are cast, determine which
parties and candidates have sufficient public support to warrant listing on
them, set deadlines for candidate selection, and so on. Many of these
restrictions will extensively regulate the right, but without them, exercise
of the right becomes impossible.125 While it makes sense to screen out
challenges to trifling restrictions of the right to arms, as suggested
above,126 an effort to screen out all challenges but “substantial” ones lacks
merit.
D. The Degree of Intermediate Scrutiny Applied
Intermediate scrutiny is the most indeterminate of the standards of
review and, as has been seen, can be applied in many degrees. By
presuming constitutionality with almost unlimited deference to the
legislative process, and accepting justifications based upon speculation
rather than evidence, some courts have sometimes applied the standard so
loosely to firearm cases that it takes on the attributes of rational basis
review. In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit accorded “substantial deference
to the predictive judgments”127 of legislators, even though the only proof of
their predictive judgments was their act of passing the law.128 In Schrader
v. Holder,129 the D.C. Circuit upheld a Maryland statute because
“plaintiffs . . . offered no evidence” that the persons restricted by the

122
See supra Part V.A; see also Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated en
banc, 681 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We are satisfied that a substantial burden framework will prove to
be far more judicially manageable than an approach that would reflexively apply strict scrutiny to all
gun-control laws.”).
123
See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997) (discussing
different standards of scrutiny for different types of election regulations).
124
See id. at 358 (setting forth the relevant levels of scrutiny).
125
See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”).
126
See supra Part VI.A.
127
701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128
Id. at 97, 101.
129
704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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statute posed “an insignificant risk” of violence, essentially putting the
burden of proof on the law’s challengers rather than on its defenders. In In
re Pantano,131 a New Jersey appellate court upheld a denial of a handgun
permit under the state’s strict permitting system, citing “the presumption of
[the] law’s constitutionality,”132 which is inapplicable under heightened
review. All of these approaches are consistent with rational basis review,
not with intermediate scrutiny.
A stricter application, resembling that used by the Seventh Circuit,
appears warranted here. As shown above, significant restrictions on the
right to arms are associated with indications that majoritarianism is little
protection for the rights of a minority. Such restrictions tend to be found in
states where gun owners form an exceptionally small minority of
households. They frequently exempt those in power, their agents, and
those with political sway such as retired law enforcement or (in practice, if
not in law) campaign contributors.133 If the powerful can exempt
themselves and their friends from the law, they need not concern
themselves about its burdens. Some laws even appear to have features that
serve no apparent purpose other than burdening a disfavored minority.134
In applying a strict version of intermediate review, courts should
demand that empirical data be presented that supports a gun restriction. As
might be expected, given that the relationship between guns, gun control,
and crime has been a contentious issue for around half a century, there is a
considerable body of sophisticated analysis on the subject.
At the broadest level, Professor David J. Bordua undertook to analyze
data from Illinois’s 102 counties, which varied widely in levels of firearm
ownership and crime rates.135 He employed three measures to determine
firearm ownership—the number of Firearm Owner Identification (“FOID”)
cards (required by state law before a person can possess a firearm), the
results of three telephone surveys regarding firearms ownership, and a
combination of FOID cards and survey results.136
Working with the raw data, Bordua found that total gun ownership was
negatively related to violent crime.137 Male gun ownership had a strong
negative relationship, while female gun ownership had a positive
130

Id. at 990.
60 A.3d 507 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
132
Id. at 514.
133
See supra Part III (discussing the need for heightened review in cases where majoritarian
values infringe on minority rights).
134
While such laws should undoubtedly be held unconstitutional, states with strict gun control
laws continue to employ laws, such as “one-gun-a-month” laws, that serve no purpose. See supra text
accompanying notes 66–69.
135
David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership and Violent Crime: A Comparison of Illinois Counties,
in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME 156 (James M. Bryne & Robert J. Sampson eds., 1986).
136
Id. at 156 n.1.
137
Id. at 169.
131
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relationship to violent crime levels.
Since surveys had shown female
firearm owners were much more likely than male owners to own for selfprotection, the latter statistic was more likely a matter of crime-causing
gun ownership than the other way around.139 The same held true for
handgun ownership.140
These data were not too surprising. They were, after all, raw data, and
firearms ownership tends to be higher in rural areas, while violent crime
tends to occur more in urban environments.141 So Bordua proceeded to
apply multivariate tools, compensating for a number of other factors found
in other studies to affect violent crime rates, such as urbanization,
population density, age, and race.142 He further analyzed data on firearms
ownership based on gender and broke down gun ownership into total
ownership, handgun-only ownership, long gun-only ownership, and
ownership of both.143 Combining these variables with various types of
violent crime yielded 165 equations. The results:
Two findings leap out of the table. First, there is no general
relationship at all between firearms ownership and violent
crime rates comparing these Illinois counties. Generally
speaking, both the negative male and positive female
relationship disappear.
Second, there is a positive
relationship with firearms murder but not with criminal
homicide generally.144
This would be consistent with the idea that “where firearms are
available, killers will use them; where they are not available, they will use
something else.”145 But Bordua proceeded to further analyze and conclude
that based on gender, the association between female gun ownership and
gun homicide rates was attributable to violent-crime-causing female gun
ownership.146 “Causally, only one plausible interpretation survives the
analysis. At least one form of crime causes at least one kind of firearms
ownership. Firearms murder increases female gun ownership.”147
Bordua’s work is by no means the alpha and the omega of the studies
on firearms and crime, which have become so voluminous that Professor
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Gary Kleck has devoted two books to summarizing their findings, one of
which won the American Society of Criminology’s Michael J. Hindelang
award for the most outstanding contribution to research in criminology.149
To highlight a few of Kleck’s points:
• There have been numerous studies regarding the frequency
with which victims of crime use firearms in self-defense.
Kleck’s own survey was the most comprehensive, and
estimated 2.5 million such uses per year.150 Twelve other
surveys have focused on the same question: ten found at least
a million uses per year, and the remaining two found over
700,000.151
• Criminal use of “assault weapons” is a very small part of
criminal firearms use. Forty studies, mostly local, found
such weapons to form 0–4.3% of crime guns. Twenty of
those studies found they formed 1% or less of crime guns.152
• Permissive licensing of concealed firearms carrying has no
discernable negative effects. In Florida, the first state to
adopt such a system, the fraction of permit holders who are
convicted of any offense involving a gun is 0.03% per
year.153
• There is some reason to believe that prohibitions on gun
possession by convicted criminals and the mentally ill, and
background checks or permit systems to enforce these
restrictions, have beneficial effects. Beyond this, gun control
measures have no discernable effect on violent crime rates.154
Narrower studies on specific topics may be added to Kleck’s work.
1. Concealed Carry Regulations
Most states require a permit for concealed carrying (and sometimes all
148
GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1991); GARY KLECK,
TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL (1997) [hereinafter KLECK, TARGETING GUNS].
149
ASC Award Winners, AM. SOC. CRIMINOLOGY, http://www.asc41.com/awards/awardWinners.
html#michael (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
150
KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 148, at 150–51. For other studies worthy of mention,
see DON B. KATES, JR., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY (1984), and JAMES D.
WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1983). For a more
controversial addition to this literature, arguing that increasing the number of guns carried by lawabiding citizens will lead to a subsequent decrease in criminal activity, see JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE
GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 19 (1998).
151
KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 148, at 187–88.
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153
Id. at 370.
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or most carrying) of a firearm.
The permit systems generally fall into
two categories: “may issue” and “shall issue.” In a “may issue” state, the
permitting authority has complete or almost complete discretion in
deciding whether to issue the permit.156 In a “shall issue” state, the
permitting authority must issue the permit if the applicant meets certain
broad criteria, such as passing a background check and attending a training
course.157
The effects of going from “may issue” to “shall issue”158 are subject to
serious dispute. Economist John Lott has devoted articles, and ultimately
an entire book, to his argument that the effect is to reduce crime by making
self-defense more available to potential victims.159 As might be expected
his work was criticized,160 and Lott devoted a chapter of his book to
answering the critics.161
2. Specific Forms of Firearms Control
There have also been studies assessing the impact of specific forms of
gun control. One study undertook to determine the relationships between
firearm homicide, firearm suicide, total homicide, and total suicide, and
age requirements for handgun purchase and possession, “one-gun-amonth” laws, “shall issue” carry permits, and bans on cheap handguns.162
No relationships could be found between these laws and homicide or
suicide, except that “shall issue” permits were associated with higher
firearm homicide and homicide rates, but not at a statistically significant
level.163
Another study sought to determine the effect of waiting periods and
background checks upon homicide and suicide, as judged by the impact of
the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.164 At the time of its
155
See Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second
Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1497 (2014) (noting that Alaska, Arizona, Vermont, and Wyoming
are the only four states that do not require a permit to carry a concealed weapon).
156
See id. at 1498 (explaining that “may issue” states require “good character, good reason, or
both, as judged by state or local officials, to carry a weapon”).
157
See id. (noting that “shall issue” states give “states and municipalities no choice but to issue a
permit so long as the person is not a felon, a domestic violence offender, or seriously mentally ill”).
158
I am unaware of any state that has gone from “shall issue” to “may issue.”
159
LOTT, supra note 150, at 19–20.
160
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2003) (acknowledging Lott’s important contribution to this
issue, but finding that statistical evidence that these laws have reduced crime is limited, sporadic, and
extraordinarily fragile”).
161
LOTT, supra note 150, at 122–57.
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M. Rosengart et al., An Evaluation of State Firearms Regulations and Homicide and Suicide
Death Rates, 11 INJ. PREVENTION 77, 77 (2005).
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Id. at 77, 79.
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Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 586 (2000).
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enactment, some states had background check and/or waiting period
requirements,165 while others did not. The 1993 federal statute required a
background check for sales by licensed dealers nationwide and, for a time,
imposed a de facto waiting period of up to five business days.166 In some
jurisdictions the waiting period and background check requirement
changed, while in others (the jurisdictions that already had these) there was
no change.
The study concluded that no relationship could be found between
imposition of the waiting period, or of the background check, and firearms
homicide and suicide, with one exception—that of suicide victims aged
fifty-five or older.167 That finding was somewhat offset by a rise in nonfirearm suicides, leaving a “modest (though not statistically significant)
reduction.”168
These data have been supplemented by two surveys of the literature in
the area. The first survey was conducted by the Task Force on Community
Preventive Services of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
which appraised fifty-one existing studies of firearms legislation and
violent crime.169 The Task Force found that studies produced inconsistent
results when measuring the effects of firearms or ammunition bans.170
Similarly, other studies analyzing restrictions on firearms acquisition were
plagued by inconsistency—the Task Force highlighted one study, however,
that observed a statistically significant reduction in firearms suicide (but
not total suicide) among persons aged fifty-five years or older.171
Moreover, it cautioned that studies of enacting “shall issue” concealed
carry permit regimes were badly flawed.172 Finally, out of three states that
had enacted “child access prevention laws,” the Task Force called attention
to one study that found a reduction of accidental deaths in one state, but it
advised that “too few studies of [child access prevention] laws ha[d] been
done, and the findings of existing studies were inconsistent.”173
165
For example, some states had a requirement that when a dealer sold a firearm or a handgun, he
had to delay its delivery by a certain number of days. For an analysis of which states had such
requirements, see id. at 586.
166
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1536,
1536–37 (1993). The interim statutory system required local officials to perform the background check
and set a maximum three day period for its performance. Id. § 102(b), 107 Stat. at 1539. The actual
waiting period thus varied depending upon the officials’ willingness and workload.
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The second survey was undertaken by the National Research Council’s
Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms.174
One study found that Virginia’s “one-gun-a-month” law indirectly reduced
gun violence by minimizing gun smuggling to New York and
Massachusetts,175 while another study concluded that the Brady Act’s
background check requirements and waiting periods had no significant
impact on homicide and suicide rates, except for persons aged fifty-five
and older.176 Beyond that, there was little evidence that firearms
restrictions affected violence. Assault weapon bans would have an effect
so small that it would be “difficult to disentangle [them] from chance
yearly variation.”177 With regard to John Lott’s contention that “shall
issue” concealed weapons permit laws are associated with reductions in
violence, the committee concluded that “with the current evidence it is not
possible to determine that there is a causal link between the passage of
right-to-carry laws and crime rates.”178
Yale sociologist Andrew V. Papachristos has recently published a pair
of studies that, while not directly addressing the issue of guns and violence,
can advise us regarding that issue. The first study looked at two highcrime Boston neighborhoods and found that 85% of gunshot victims were
found within the same social network.179
Within that network,
interpersonal relationships could be assessed by police reports mentioning
sighting or questioning individuals together.180 By that measure, every
network step away from a shooting victim (i.e., from having been
questioned with the victim to having been questioned with someone else
who was questioned with the victim) decreased a person’s chance of
174

CHARLES F. WELLFORD ET AL., FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 13 (2005).
Id. at 92.
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reductions. See id. at 269–70 (arguing that the committee confirmed Lott’s finding that “murder rates
decline after the adoption of [right-to-carry] laws,” and expressing his confusion over the committee’s
characterization of Lott’s claim as “fragile”). Wilson contended that Lott’s critics “do not show that
the passage of [right-to-carry] laws drives the crime rates up.” Id. at 270. One commentator has even
remarked that the fear that “concealed carry laws would lead to carnage in the streets, with otherwise
law-abiding people suddenly becoming murderers” is no longer on the table. Nicholas J. Johnson,
Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 1491, 1597 (2013). Ultimately, Wilson concluded that “the best evidence we have is that [rightto-carry] impose no costs but may confer benefits.” WELLFORD ET AL., supra note 174, at 270.
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Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Social Networks and the Risk of Gunshot Injury, 89 J. URBAN
HEALTH 992, 997 (2012).
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See id. at 994 (explaining that data came from “non-criminal encounters or observations made
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becoming a victim by approximately 25%.
The second study focused upon a Chicago neighborhood that had a
homicide rate of 55 per 100,000 individuals.182 The study tracked
individuals over a five-year period and focused on whether they had been
“coarrested” (arrested along with another person, for the same offense)
during that timeframe.183 At the outset, it was apparent that 41% of gun
homicides occurred within a network comprising about 4% of the
community.184 Further analysis showed even stronger patterns: “Simply
being arrested during this [five year] period increases the aggregate
homicide rate by nearly 50%, but being in a network component with a
homicide victim increases the homicide rate by a staggering 900%.”185
Papachristos’s findings suggest that the key issue in gun control (and
issuance of firearms permits) is not so much ensuring that guns are
restricted to the best of citizens, but rather that a person’s social network
can increase the vulnerability of becoming a murder victim. It seems that a
more targeted approach to individuals who associate with murder victims
and are constantly surrounded by gun violence will most effectively reduce
the risk of violence.
VII. CONCLUSION
Standard of review is the key threshold issue in a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute. In the developing Second Amendment
context, all courts have chosen intermediate review as the appropriate
standard, but how that is applied is subject to wide variations between the
circuits, with some applying it exactingly and others treating it as if it were
rational basis review.
The best approach involves application of genuine intermediate
review, with the government bearing the burden of proof; requiring
justification by hard data, rather than speculation; and restricting
unjustified overbreadth. As auxiliary tests, rational basis might be applied
to measures that impose no real burden on the right to arms, and strict
scrutiny to those that burden possession in the home by law-abiding
citizens.
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